Indirect Prompt Injection Arena
Benchmark metadata from benchwiki — this page mirrors their record so scores can be joined to it. The original is canonical.
What it measures
Forty-one agent scenarios derived from a 272,000-attempt public competition on concealed indirect prompt injection.
- Primary metric
- concealed attack success rate (%) - lower is safer
- Judge model
- not judged by a model
- Human baseline
- not reportedNo human agent baseline is defined. The source evidence is adversarial competition success against model-based agents.
- Languages
- English
Health
The public competition had 464 participants, 272,000 attack attempts, 8,648 successful attacks, 13 frontier models, and 41 scenarios. Timeline points use overall competition ASR, not curated transfer ASR; lower is safer. Timeline dates are model public-launch dates, not competition or evaluation dates.
- Status evidence
- This is a current, agent-level security benchmark with tool, coding, and browser scenarios; every tested frontier model was vulnerable in the 2026 competition.
- Saturated since
- not saturated
- Refresh cycle
- continuous
- Test set public
- yes
The open release includes 41 behaviors and 95 attacks across 28 behaviors, while production evaluation should add private scenarios, rotate untrusted-content locations, and keep tool side effects sandboxed.
Models scored on this benchmark
The reverse lookup, which is this site’s addition: every model here with a score on this benchmark. Independent measurements and vendor-reported numbers are kept apart rather than interleaved, because they are different claims.
No model on this site has a score on this benchmark yet. That usually means the models that were measured on it are not in the registry, rather than that nobody has run it.
Trajectory
Source
This record is maintained by benchwiki and mirrored here. Read the original. Upstream last updated 2026-09-14; fetched 2026-10-19 by this site.